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THE EMERGING RIGHT OF
LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE
INDIGENT IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one command-
ment: Thou shalt not ration justice.
Learned Hand'
After the Supreme Court declared in Gideon v. Wainwright2 that in-
digents have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in criminal cases,
attention turned to the possibility that a similar right could be found for civil
litigants. 3 Although there is no explicit constitutional guarantee of counsel
for the civil litigant, the due process clause, which protects property rights as
well as personal freedoms, arguably mandates that there be a right to pro-
fessional representation of all citizens in all courts. 4 The inability of most
laymen to effectively present even a rudimentary case on their own behalf
indicates that without counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard is
impossible, and an adverse judgment could thus constitute a deprivation
of property without due process of law.5
This thesis has not met with widespread judicial acceptance. A sig-
nificant number of recent state and federal decisions, however, have dealt
with the question of appointing counsel in civil cases. This note will ex-
amine these recent decisions in an effort to provide a framework for
analyzing the desirability and constitutional necessity of appointing counsel
for indigent civil litigants. After attempting to show that the distinction
between civil and criminal cases is an inappropriate basis for determining
the need for counsel, an effort will be made to demonstrate constitutional
support for supplying indigents with legal assistance in all civil cases. In
addition, several specific objections likely to be raised to such a broad
expansion of the right to counsel will be considered with an analysis of
the merits of each such argument.
1 Hand, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice, 9 NLADA BRIEFCASE 3, 5 (1951) (ad-
dress before the Legal Aid Society of New York).
2 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 Comment, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel]; Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel
in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Indigent's Right].
4 Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (an indigent divorce litigant
cannot be denied access to the courts for failure to pay required court costs). See also
notes 16-21 and accompanying text infra.
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Legal Assistance in Civil Proceedings
I. THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
A. Due Process
The reason most often relied upon for not appointing counsel on be-
half of the indigent civil litigant is the belief, based upon a literal analysis
of the Constitution, that there is a distinction between the requirements
of due process in criminal and civil proceedings. 6 In Gideon v. Wainwright7
the Court based the requirement of counsel in criminal cases upon the
guarantees of the sixth amendment and upon the peculiarly coercive nature
of a criminal trial. Concluding that the right to counsel in criminal cases
is "fundamental and [therefore] essential to a fair trial," the requirement
was held to be made obligatory upon the states by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,9 the Court held that, although Gideon in-
volved a felony, its due process rationale is broad enough to require
appointment of counsel in any trial where the accused stands a chance of
being deprived of his liberty.10 Yet, despite the Court's rejection of the
contention that due process only requires appointment of counsel when
the defendant stands a chance of being convicted of a major crime, the
lack of a seventh amendment guarantee of counsel was said to prevent
an application of the decision to the civil litigant despite the similarity
of interests at stake in misdemeanor and civil actions." While this would
indeed appear to be the position of most courts today, substantial reason
exists to challenge its validity.
Historical analysis indicates that the due process clause need not be
read as limited to the literal requirements of the sixth amendment, and
that the Court's reliance on the lack of a counsel requirement in the seventh
amendment may be misplaced. The drafters of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights borrowed much from the English judicial system during a
time when counsel was appointed for indigents in England's civil courts
as a matter of course.12 Indeed, in England in 1789 it was the criminal
defendant who was frequently forced to face the tribunal unassisted by
counsel, even if he had the means to retain an attorney. It is not sur-
prising, then, that the framers found a specific guarantee of counsel neces-
6 See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (civil litigant
has only a privilege, not a right, to request discretionary appointment of counsel);
In re Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 964 (1971) (civil-criminal distinction cannot be ignored); Dear v. Locke, 128
I11. App. 2d 356, 262 N.E.2d 27 (1970) (denial of counsel in civil proceedings is
not a denial of due process or equal protection).
7 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Id. at 340.
9407 U.S. 25 (1972).
10 See generally Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1331. Both Gideon and Arger-
singer drew support from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), in which the
Court held that the right to counsel in criminal cases is an outgrowth of the con-
stitutional right to a hearing.
11 See notes 27-32 and accompanying text infra.
12 Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1325-27.
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sary only for criminal trials; there was simply no need to reaffirm the
rights already routinely enjoyed in the civil courts.
Moreover, while ostensibly based upon the sixth amendment, Gideon
was explicitly tied to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court held that because a layman appearing pro se could not be
assured a fair trial, the assistance of counsel was a fundamental right
incorporated into the due process clause. 13 The Court's decision to view
due process as requiring counsel for the purpose of securing a fair trial,
however, makes it difficult to analyze the fourteenth amendment in terms
of criminal cases alone. As was apprehensively noted by Justice Roberts
speaking for the majority in Betts v. Brady,14
[A]s the fourteenth amendment extends the protection of due
process to property as well as to life and liberty .... logic would
require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving prop-
erty. 5
Thus, since the Court has determined in Gideon that the interests pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment can only be preserved at a trial con-
cerning life and liberty, when the citizen is represented by counsel, logic
indicates that civil property rights should receive the same protection. A
mechanistic reliance on the differences between the sixth and seventh
amendments is, at best, an oversimplified method of determining the
requirements of due process. Indeed, the Court did not so rely in Gideon;
instead, the Court tied the right to appointed counsel for indigent crim-
inal defendants to the fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, a number of
recent court decisions suggest that the due process requirement of counsel
for a fair trial embraces certain civil proceedings as well as the criminal
trial.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,'0 the Court prohibited a state from denying
indigents access to its divorce courts because of their inability to pay court
costs. The Court held that, absent a countervailing state interest of over-
riding significance, the due process clause requires that persons forced
to settle their claims through the judicial process be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.' 7 Although the Court sought to limit the applica-
tion of Boddie to its facts,' 8 it should be recognized that a meaningful
13 372 U.S. at 342.
14 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (denied the right to appointed counsel; Betts was overruled
in Gideon).
15 Id. at 473.
16401 U.S. 371 (1971).
'7 Id. at 377.
18 The Court was careful to warn as to the narrowness of its decision. Only those
unusual legal matters like marriage and divorce which require use of the court
system for settlement were to be affected. There is considerable question as to the
validity of such a limitation, however. Justice Douglas, for example, felt Boddie
should have been decided on the basis of equal protection rather than due process
(401 U.S. 371, 383) (Douglas, J., concurring in result). Douglas pointed out that
over the past several years the Court has applied a stricter scrutiny where the classi-
fication in question was based on "suspect criteria" and that, while these criteria are
not definable with mathematical precision, rather definite guidelines have neverthe-
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opportunity to be heard is an established component of due process10
which can only be guaranteed by supplying counsel to those who cannot
afford to retain their own.20 Therefore, a meaningful opportunity to be
heard is mandated by the fourteenth amendment in civil litigation whenever
there is a potential deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 21
Boddie was narrowly construed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Matter of Smiley.22 In holding against an indigent woman who sought
appointed counsel for her divorce action, the Court reversed the trend
of earlier New York cases23 and found that there was no constitutional
authority for appointment of counsel in civil cases.2 4 Chief Justice Breitel,
speaking for the court, rejected the idea that Boddie was controlling and
expressed concern that if such a right to counsel were found, it might place
an undue burden on the bar which might be itself a constitutional viola-
tion.2 5
However, Smiley should not be read to dispose of the argument that
due process requires the appointment of counsel in civil cases. 26 The
less developed, including poverty. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
19 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).20 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
21 Boddie invalidated, at least in certain cases, court costs that amount to barriers
to court access. It may be argued that a lawyer's fee is a court cost imposed by the
state and as such should be invalidated as an impediment to a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co. (Indigents' Cases), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 954 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Rodriguez v. Rcsenblatt, 58 N.J. 281,
277 A.2d 216 (1971); Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975) (Jones, J., dissenting); Matter of Ella B., 30 "N.Y.2d 352, 285
N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27
N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971); Vanderpool v. Vanderpool,
74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572, rev'd on other grounds, 40 App. Div. 1030, 339
N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973).
22 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).
23 Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973);
Matter of Bartlett, 76 Misc. 2d 1087 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 74
Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572, rev'd on other grounds, 40 App. Div. 1030, 339
N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973).
24 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975). The court reasoned
that despite petitioner's claims to the contrary, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) does not imply an obligation on the part of the state to assign or compensate
counsel as a matter of right in private litigation since counsel is not a condition of
access and indigents do have alternative practical resources. 36 N.Y.2d at 440, 330
N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
25 36 N.Y.2d at 441, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
26 Indeed, Breitel makes it clear that his decision was influenced by his perception
of a lack of implementation power on the part of the courts. 36 N.Y.2d at 438-39,
330 N.E.2d at 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92. Thus, while noting with concern the
problems of the indigent and the constitutional questions involved, the Smiley de-
cision is based upon the section of the New York State constitution (art. XVI, § 1)
that gives the authority for the expenditure of funds to the legislature rather than thejudiciary. If the Supreme Court found a constitutional right to counsel, that decision
would take precedence over the New York constitution's limitations by virtue of
the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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New York court failed to see the significant parallels between civil and
criminal cases that indicate that there is a valid constitutional basis for
establishing the right to counsel in civil cases under the due process clause.
It is just as difficult for a layman to successfully present his case in a
civil action as it is in a criminal proceeding. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has long recognized this fact with regard to retained counsel.
If in any case, civil or criminal, a . . .court were arbitrarily to
refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it... would be a denial of a hearing and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutional sense.27
The concerns that affect criminal defendants are also present in civil
proceedings. The civil litigant is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence
and procedure, does not know how to research and present the law, and
has no training in the marshalling and presenting of facts.
Moreover, while the argument that criminal sanctions are more severe
than typical civil sanctions, entitling the criminal defendant to greater
protection, may have validity with regard to some civil proceedings, this
distinction is not universally true. Several decisions have recognized that
the consequences involved in certain civil proceedings are threats to
fundamental interests no less important than freedom. 2 8 Included in this
category are proceedings where personal liberty is, in fact, very much at
stake: parole revocations, 29 juvenile hearings, habeas corpus proceedings,
civil commitments, custody hearings, 30 and other matters in which "certain
nominally civil causes can result in a severe deprivation of liberty. ' ' 3'
27 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
28 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meacham, 382 F. Supp. 996 (D.C. Wyo. 1974) (no con-
stitutional right to counsel unless the action has the characteristics of being essentially
criminal or penal in nature); Carter v. Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr.
678 (1970) (under the rationale of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), counsel needs to
be provided in cases denominated "civil" that are basically criminal in nature).
29 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Court held that there was no
per se right to appointed counsel in probation or parole revocation proceedings.
But, insofar as its applicability to civil trials in a broader sense is concerned, Gagnon
can be distinguished on several grounds and thus read as not precluding the rights
of civil indigents other than those facing the revocation proceedings mentioned. For
example, the Court's chief concern was the fear that the nontrial atmosphere of
parole and probation revocation hearings would be jeopardized by the introduction
of counsel. The Court noted that the discretionary atmosphere allows the parole
board to be more "attuned to the rehabilitative needs" of the probationer or parolee.
Yet, in most civil cases, the very issue under consideration is that of a full blown
trial with all its formalities. Thus, even if there is a benefit to appearing pro se in a
revocation hearing, there is no such corresponding benefit for most civil litigants.
An even stronger refutation of the applicability of Gagnon is the Court's state-
ment that its decision was tailored to persons who are probationers and parolees
only because they have been convicted of a crime. This was held to justify a "more
limited due process right" than that owed an accused at his initial trial. Because a
civil litigant, like the criminal defendant awaiting his first trial, is yet untainted by a
court decision against him, no reason exists to limit him to this more limited degree
of due process.
30 See part II A infra.
31 Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1332.
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All of these actions have a common thread running through them. In
each, the state employs
the judicial mechanism it has created to enforce society's will
upon an individual .... [As a result, such] cases by [their] very
nature resemble a criminal proceeding. 32
Recalling that it was this very spectre of a lone citizen facing the vast
machinery of justice that led to the Court's decision in Gideon to require
counsel for the indigent criminal defendant as a matter of due process,
the applicability of that argument to civil cases makes it evident that the
civil-criminal distinction is not an appropriate method of determining
the limits of the fourteenth amendment. Rather, due process should be
read to require counsel for at least some indigents in our nation's civil
courts. The question is whether fundamental fairness requires that all
civil litigants be provided with counsel as a matter of due process. This
will be considered in part II.
B. Equal Protection
Differing availability of counsel for the rich and the poor may deny equal
protection under the law by allowing the rich a more meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard in court. 33 Despite the Court's lack of reliance on equal
protection in deciding on the breadth of the right to counsel in Gideon,
a recent line of cases suggests that such a basis would not be inappropriate.
1. The Griffin-Douglas "Equality" Principle34-In Griffin v. Illinois,35
the Court held that the inability to pay for a required trial transcript could
not bar a defendant from taking an appeal. The Court stated that "there
can be no justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has."'36 There was no majority opinion in Griffin,37 but its
underlying principle has been broadly applied.38
32 Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co. (Indigents' Cases), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 954
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
33 Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1333; Indigent's Rights, supra note 3, at 550.
34 Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 67 (4th
ed. 1974).
35 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
36 Id. at 19. Griffin and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), guarantee
rights on appeal to the convicted criminal defendant who has already had a trial at
which to make his case. These same rights are denied to the civil litigant at his
original trial. See Indigent's Right, supra note 3, at 550:
The relative importance of criminal appeal and civil trial in our con-
stitutional scheme is suggested by the reminder in Griffin that due
process does not require the states to have any appellate system at all
(351 U.S. 12 at 18, 20-21). It is difficult to imagine the Court holding
that the entire system of civil trial courts is similarly dispensable.
37 Justice Black announced the Court's decision in a four-man plurality opinion;
Justice Frankfurter concurred specially.
38 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (indigent convicted of offenses punish-
able by fine only cannot be jailed a sufficient time to satisfy fines); Roberts v.
LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam) (indigent defendant entitled to a free
transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial, even though both defendant and
his lawyer attended the preliminary hearing); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(a state cannot require an indigent defendant to pay a filing fee before permitting
him to appeal).
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Later, in Douglas v. California,39 the Court found that state appointment
of attorneys for indigent criminal defendants taking their first appeal is con-
stitutionally required. The Court reasoned that, since a layman attempting
to write his own appeal is participating in nothing more than a "meaning-
less ritual," while the rich man has a meaningful appeal, failure to ap-
point counsel for the indigent would be a denial of equal protection. The
implication of this holding is that the denial of appointed counsel to an
indigent defendant amounts, under our adversary system, to denial
of the defendant's constitutional guarantee of equal protection under
the law.40 Denial of counsel in a civil action would be no less a case of
abridging equal protection than it is in a criminal proceeding. In both
cases, the monied litigant has a skilled professional laboring on his behalf
while the indigent must perform tasks acknowledged to be beyond the
capabilities of laymen. 41 This amounts to treating the poor as second class
citizens, a distinction the Court has refused to allow.42
The most far-reaching application of the Griffin-Douglas equality prin-
ciple occurred in Mayer v. Chicago.43 There, the Court held that, based
upon Griffin, an indigent criminal defendant could not be denied a "record
of sufficient completeness" to permit proper consideration of his claims
simply because he was convicted of a mere ordinance violation. The Court
rejected the city of Chicago's contention that, since the defendant was sub-
ject only to a fine rather than imprisonment, his interests in receiving a
transcript were outweighed by the state's fiscal and other interests in not
burdening the appellate process. 44 Griffin is not, said the Court, a balance
between the needs of the accused and the interests of society but is rather
a "flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective
an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way."'45
This logic supports the application of the Griffin-Douglas principle to the
indigent in a civil proceeding as well, since the civil litigant frequently
faces a judgment as large as any fine faced by a criminal defendant. In-
deed, there are civil actions which threaten more drastic penalties than
39 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
40 See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1963):
Reading [Douglas] for all it may be worth, [indigents] may find they
have also been awarded absolute rights to assigned counsel ... every-
where a rich man may appear with counsel.
See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974) and note 48 infra. See also Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Over-
ruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 211, 247.
41 See generally part II B infra.
42 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking
down a state poll tax).
43 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
44 Id. at 196. The Court stated:
The size of a defendant's pocketbook bears no more relationship to
his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than in a felony case, calling
such a distinction "unreasoned" and proscribed by the fourteenth
amendment.
45 Id. at 196-97.
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those faced by the criminal defendants who receive counsel as a result of
Mayer,46 such as losing the custody of one's child as a result of being found
an incompetent parent.
In Ross v. Moffitt, 47 however, the Court gave the Griffin-Douglas prin-
ciple a more restricted reading. The Court declined to require a state to
appoint counsel for indigents who, having been convicted of a criminal
offense and having lost their appeal, wanted a second discretionary appeal
from the conviction. Although the long range implications of the Ross
decision are not yet clear, it may at least be said that the present Court
has determined that it is unwilling to let the Griffin-Douglas principle ex-
pand indefinitely. The Court stated:
[T]here are obviously limits beyond which the equal protection
analysis may not be pressed without doing violence to principles
recognized in other decisions of this Court. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages ... nor does it require the State to equalize economic
conditions . . . . It does require that the State appellate system
be free of unreasoned distinctions . . . and that indigents have an
adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the
adversarial system.48
Since no precise guidelines as to which distinctions were to be considered
reasonable were offered by the Court, it may be supposed that, after the
extension of Griffin in Mayer, the Court decided that it had to stop some-
where and that a second appeal, arguably "noncritical," was as good a
place as any since the defendant would still be guaranteed a fair trial and
at least one appeal. Such a limitation would be inapplicable to the civil
litigant who has yet to have his day in court at all. The Court's repeated em-
phasis on the appellant having already had assistance of counsel at trial and
during his first appeal leaves the basic equal protection argument for coun-
sel in civil litigation unaffected. Nevertheless, the now somewhat confused
direction of the Griffin-Douglas line of cases indicates that the Court may
be very hesitant to rely on this rationale in other areas without persuasive
theoretical advocacy.
2. State Action-Even without the problems raised by Ross, it may be
argued that framing the appeal for appointed counsel in civil cases in
terms of the recognition of a suspect distinction ignores one of the re-
4 6 See note 28 supra.
47417 U.S. 600 (1974).
48 Id. at 612. At least one commentator believes that Ross v. MofJitt will have a
drastic effect on the Griffin-Douglas line of cases:
The "equality" principle once loomed as an awesome weapon, one
with almost unlimited range, but-now that Moffitt is on the books-
on many procedural frontiers this once treasured weapon may add
nothing to what the indigent defendant or prisoner has in his legal
arsenal.
Y. KAMISAR, POVERTY, EQUALITY AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FROM GRIFFIN V. ILLI-
NOIS AND DOUGLAS V. CALIFORNIA TO Ross V. MOFFITT (1976) (teaching materials
prepared for Constitutional Law Desk Assessment Course, National College of
District Attorneys).
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quirements of any equal protection claim, a showing of state action. 49 This
argument does not apply with equal force to all civil cases, however. The
participation of the government in certain state-initiated proceedings
provides the required state action in some cases denominated as "civil." 50
Moreover, even where the government is not a party to the suit, the civil
litigant is exposed to the coercive judicial machinery of the government.
The government's readiness to enforce all court judgments arguably con-
stitutes state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 51
II. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN DIFFERENT CIVIL ACTIONS
Although the above arguments demonstrate significant parallels be-
tween the civil and criminal justice systems, the rationale for supplying
counsel to indigents may be seen to vary in different types of civil cases.
Certain actions, such as child-custody hearings, bear a striking procedural
resemblance to criminal trials and deal with similarly fundamental rights
such as the preservation of the family unit. While many of the same con-
siderations justify providing counsel for indigents in a tort action, the
absence of a "fundamental interest" demonstrates a lesser parallel to
criminal proceedings for such actions.
A. Government-Initiated Proceedings
Government-initiated civil proceedings have many of the elements of
criminal trials. The lay citizen faces the government's massive bureau-
cratic machinery, complete with lawyers and investigators, and typically
finds himself feeling helpless and alone. Perhaps the best illustration of
the necessity for counsel encountered by a civil litigant in this situation
is the child neglect hearing.52 The courts in such cases have recognized
the necessity of protecting fundamental rights, such as the sanctity of the
whole family unit, from being infringed upon by the government without
allowing every possible protection to those subject to the courts' decrees. 53
49 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). But see Silard, A Constitu-
tional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guaran-
tee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966). The requirement of showing state action applies
to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as well.
50 E.g., custody and neglect proceedings, commitments, parole and probation re-
vocation.
51 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state enforcement of property rights
must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the fourteenth amendment).
52 See 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 623, 629 n.43 (1975).
53 In State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 117, 444 P.2d 15, 17 (1968), the court
stated:
It would be unconscionable for the state forever to terminate the
parental rights of the poor without allowing such parents to be
assisted by counsel.
[VOL. 9:554
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Such rights should include appointed counsel for those too poor to retain
their own.54
It has been suggested that the introduction of counsel in these "other-
wise informal proceedings" would lead to a "substantial criminalization"
of the custodial determination process by making the parties adversaries
instead of seeking in common the solution that is "best for the child." '55
Yet serious fault can be found with such a position. In Matter of Ella B.,56
the New York Court of Appeals held that the state is an adversary in
such a proceeding and it, therefore, would be fundamentally unfair to
seek removal of a child from an indigent parent without according the
parent the right to assistance of court appointed and compensated coun-
sel. 57 The rationale of the child custody cases applies to any case where
4 See Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974); Chambers v. District
Court, 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967) (right of appeal without right to ap-
pointed counsel is a mere sham and fails to meet constitutional requirements); Dan-
forth v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); Matter of Ella
B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972) (child custody "too
fundamental an interest" to be relinquished to the state without the opportunity for a
hearing with assigned counsel if necessary).
55 Similar arguments are made with respect to parole revocation proceedings. See
note 28 supra.
56 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
57 30 N.Y.2d at 356, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136. The judge of the
family court, after reading the petition (alleging neglect) to the appellant, spoke
to her as follows:
You may be represented by an attorney in this proceeding, in which case
you must obtain one yourself, and pay for him out of your own funds,
or you may waive an attorney and either admit or deny the facts in the
petition if you want. Do you want an attorney?
Mrs. B.: No.
The Court: Do you admit the facts in the petition?
Mrs. B.: Yes, I do.
Thereupon, without further ado, the judge stated that he was "going to find that
[the appellant's daughter] is a neglected child and will continue the child in custody
of the Child Protective Services." An order was entered adjudicating her a neglected
child and directing that she be placed in the petitioner's custody. In a footnote, the
court of appeals stated:
Not a word had been said to the appellant that she might lose the
custody of the child. Indeed, as the colloquy between the judge and
her made clear, she believed that she would be permitted to take the
child home and, after the judge indicated that the child was to be
taken from her, she made a feeble, and unsuccessful, attempt to set
forth circumstances which might have provided a basis for a meritorious
defense in the hands of an attorney.
30 N.Y.2d at 357, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
Several states have enacted legislation that does provide for the appointment of
counsel in neglect and dependency proceedings. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(1)(b)
(1973) (cases of delinquent children, cases of children in need of supervision or
cases when the termination of parental rights is stated as a possible remedy in the
summons); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-66b(b) (1975) (appointment in proceedings
on behalf of neglected, uncared-for, or dependent children); IDAHO CODE § 16-1631
(1974)- (upon request, court shall appoint counsel at county expense); IOWA CODE §
232.28 (1969) (right to appointment in cases for neglected, dependent and delinquent
children); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-820 (1973) (no order depriving parental rights in
neglected or dependent children without the assignment of counsel at county expense);
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the government seeks to deny an indigent person's rights. Courts have, in
such cases, appointed counsel to protect not only such obviously funda-
mental rights as the sanctity of the family, but the fiscal and proprietary in-
terests of the citizen as well.5 8 Counsel has thus been appointed for hear-
ings concerned with revocation of driver's licenses,5 9 welfare benefits, 0
and tenant evictions.6 1
B. Privately Initiated Proceedings
1. "Private" vs. "Public" Lawsuits-Some of the parallels between
civil and criminal cases do not pertain to those litigants in court by choice.
But the philosophy behind appointment of counsel for indigents is also
applicable beyond those situations in which the indigent is hailed into
court by the government. The civil court system serves as the primary
mechanism for settling private disputes as well as enforcing state regula-
tions.62 Justice Black, dissenting in the Indigents' Cases, made the following
statement:
The States and the Federal Government hold the ultimate
power of enforcement in almost every dispute. Every law student
learns in the first semester of law school that property, for in-
stance, is "valuable" only because the State will enforce the col-
lection of rights that attach to its ownership .... Similarly, the
wrong that gives rise to a right of damages in tort exists only
because society's lawmakers have created a standard of care and
a duty to abide by that standard . . . .Thus, the judicial process
is the exclusive means through which almost any dispute can ulti-
mately be resolved short of brute force. 63
Since the state plays the critical role in every proceeding in which one
party seeks to assert a superior right over another, counsel must be pro-
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1974) (right to appointed counsel at all stages of juve-
nile proceedings); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (1975) (appointment upon request if
termination of parental rights is a possible remedy and without request if court deems
it appropriate to protect the child); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-21 (1969)
(discretionary power of the court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-96 (1974) (right to
counsel at every stage of the proceeding).
In those states providing a discretionary right to counsel, some courts appoint
counsel grudgingly and in few instances. See Indigent's Right, supra note 3, at 545.
58 American Chinchilla Corp., 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 659.30, FTC Dkt. No. 8774
(Dec. 23, 1969) (right to counsel upheld at an administrative hearing before the
FTC upon fundamental fairness and concern for the rights of litigants).
59 Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 913 (Alas. 1971).
60 Aiello v. Ott, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 659.982 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1969) (equal pro-
tection held to prohibit discrimination between persqns who can afford counsel and
those who cannot in complicated administrative appeals cases). See also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (without appointing counsel
to those who cannot afford it, the right to retain counsel is a meaningless one in
welfare cases since recipients are too poor to hire their own advocates).
61 Hotel Martha Washington v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup.
Ct. 1971) (right of appointed counsel upheld for tenant who, in a suit for nonpay-
ment of rent, wished to defend her right to remain in possession).
62 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
63 Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co. (Indigents' Cases), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 954,
956-57 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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vided in privately initiated actions if the citizen's interests are to be pro-
tected against government-aided imposition.
That the Supreme Court has not adopted this point of view is evidenced
by its decision in Boddie v. Connecticut64 where it concluded that divorce,
unlike most disputed matters in society, is monopolized by the state's
judicial system since it is literally impossible to settle the question of marital
status without a court decree. In instances where there is no similar state
"monopolization," said the Court, recourse to judicial machinery for dis-
pute settlement may be useful and desirable, but it is not mandated by
the Constitution.65 In United States v. Kras,66 Chief Justice Burger provided
an example of a dispute that could be settled without court involvement.
Bankruptcy, noted Burger, is not the only method available to a debtor
for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors; rather,
many debtors work out binding private adjustments with creditors.
Boddie and Kras are shortsighted because they ignore the fact that ef-
fective settlement of any dispute depends upon enforcement in the courts. 67
The private bankruptcy settlement referred to by Chief Justice Burger,
for example, would doubtless be rejected by the creditors involved if they
did not have the potential of court enforcement of the agreement's terms
at their disposal. Whenever a dispute cannot be privately settled between
the parties, the court system is usually the only forum effectively empow-
ered to settle the dispute.6 s Indeed, the majority opinion in Boddie itself
lends credence to such an interpretation. It would be inconsistent for the
Court on the one hand to insist that marriage deserves a set of protective
rights since its settlement is uniquely monopolized by the state court
system, while at the same time noting that without a legal system struc-
tured to enforce a set of rules defining each of the various rights and duties
of its citizens social order and cohesion are impossible.60 By arguing that it
is the ability to seek regularized resolution of conflicts that makes individu-
als capable of interdependent action, the Court gives support to the view
that no type of lawsuit is really more monopolized by the state than any
other.
Boddie and Kras also suggest that the right to have a marriage dissolved
is a fundamental right deserving special constitutional protection 70 since
the inability to dissolve one's marriage impairs the freedom to pursue
other protected associational activities. 71 Actions such as bankruptcy,
while important, were held not to rise to the same constitutional level.
64401 U.S. 371 (1971).
6 5 See also Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 444 n.1, 330 N.E.2d 53, 59 n.1, 369
N.Y.S.2d 87, 96 n.1 (1975) (Jones, J., dissenting).
66409 U.S. 434 (1973) (denying claim of a debtor to file for bankruptcy without
paying the filing fees).
67 Comment, The Heirs of Boddie, Court Access for Indigents After Kras and
Ortwein, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 571, 578-79 (1973).
6s Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part). See note 62 supra.
69 401 U.S. at 374.
73 See part II A supra.
71 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973).
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But if the Court holds that the right to a divorce is fundamental in light of
the high value our society places on an intact marriage, then almost every
other kind of legally enforceable right must also be fundamental to our
society. As Justice Black stated in his Indigents' Cases dissent,
[I] cannot believe that my Brethren would find the rights of
a man with both legs cut off by a negligent railroad less "funda-
mental" than a person's right to seek a divorce. 72
The fundamental rights label should be eliminated as a stumbling block
to the Court's eventual decision on appointed counsel. It is as inappropri-
ate as the civil-criminal dichotomy.
It may be argued that counsel should only be appointed in civil cases
where the issues are too complicated for the petitioner to represent him-
self effectively. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli73 the Court held that appointment
of counsel for probation revocation proceedings was appropriate in cir-
cumstances where the lower court's ruling was based on a determination
that the issues were complex and difficult for the layman to comprehend,
and the litigant lacked the capability to speak effectively for himself. Re-
lying on Gagnon, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held in Duval v. Du-
va174 that the determination of the need for appointed counsel should be
made on a case-by-case basis. The granting of appointed counsel, the court
stated, "depends ... on circumstances which show that the defendant would
be treated unfairly if the assistance of counsel were not provided. '75
The case-by-case approach was discarded with respect to criminal liti-
gants in Gideon v. Wainwright.76 It was then revived in Gagnon because
the Court decided that a lesser degree of protection is owed to convicted
criminals on appeal than during trial. This rationale is inapplicable in the
civil setting, however. A civil litigant, like the criminal defendant awaiting
his first trial, is as yet untainted by a court decision against him. No reason
exists to limit him to the narrower degree of due process allowed by the
72402 U.S. 954, 958 (1970). This opinion is apparently shared by at least two
other presently sitting Justices. Justice Brennan, concurring in Boddie v. Connec-
ticut, stated:
I see no constitutional distinction between appellants' attempt to
enforce their state statutory right [divorce] and an attempt to vindicate
any other right arising under federal or state law.
401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971).
Justice Marshall, dissenting in United States v. Kras, also stated:
[T]he majority's focus on the relative importance in the constitu-
tional scheme of divorce and bankruptcy is misplaced. What is involved
is the importance of access to the courts, either to remove an obligation
that other branches of the government stand ready to enforce ... or to
determine claims of right....
409 U.S. at 462 n.4.
Additionally, Justice Douglas, now retired, has stated in his Indigents' Cases dis-
sent: "When indigency is involved I do not think there is a hierarchy of interests."
402 U.S. at 961.
73 411 U.S. 778 (1973). See note 28 supra.
74 322 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1974).
75 Id. at 4.
76 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Court in Gagnon. Moreover, by arguing that counsel should only be ap-
pointed where the litigant cannot adequately defend his own interests, the
New Hampshire court makes the dangerous assumption that certain types
of litigation can be competently handled by laymen. This assumption is
incorrect. As the Court recognized in Powell v. Alabama77 some individuals
are unable to manage even the least complex type of case without profes-
sional assistance. Those who are unable to afford counsel are likely to be
the least prepared to present their own cases. 78 For them, denial of counsel
prevents meaningful access to court and infringes upon their right to due
process.7 9
It is unrealistic, in the face of Boddie's requirement that all persons have
a right to meaningful and effective access to courts, to conclude that the
principles of equal justice will be served by requiring anyone to proceed
without a lawyer merely bcause he or she is unable to afford one. "[T]here
cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process until every serious
litigant is represented by competent counsel."8 0
In United States v. Nenna,81 the court indicated that appointment of
counsel should only be considered in those civil cases that appear to have
merit lest the courts be flooded with nuisance suits. There is no concom-
mitant requirement that people of means, who can retain a lawyer to press
any claim they please, no matter how frivolous, make a demonstration of
merit prior to proceeding in court.8 Such a requirement would raise ob-
77 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
78 Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 448 n.2, 330 N.E.2d 53, 62 n.2, 369 N.Y.S.2d
87, 100 n.2 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting):
While there is, of course, no precise correlation between a person's
level of affluence and his level of education, on a statistical basis low
income persons are likely to be those least prepared by their own educa-
tional background to litigate actions pro se.
79 36 N.Y.2d at 450-51, 330 N.E.2d at 64, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 102. (Fuchsberg, J., dis-
senting). Justice Fuchsberg outlined some of the complex processes that must be
faced by any lay applicant for a divorce (or, presumably, any other civil action):
[He] must first decide whether it is preferable to obtain a divorce or
an annulment. If the former, the party must select the best ground for
obtaining the divorce.... It is also necessary to marshal evidence, and
abide by technical requirements of proof.... Also, as in any civil case,
a command of the rules of procedure and skill in presenting facts are
essential.... [I]f there is a dispute over support, pretrial investigative
tools may be essential for discovering resources .... Frequently, expert
witnesses must be examined. The judge must often depend on counsel
for the effective investigation, organization, and presentation of the
facts since the law's only guide is the vaguely worded standard of
the "best interests of the child."
80 Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co. (Indigents' Cases), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 954,
959 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
81 274 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
82 Although a frivolous case will likely be attacked by demurrer or summary
judgment, the monied litigant nevertheless has the means to attempt to win his
lawsuit. Cf. Proceedings of the National Judicial Conference on Standards for the
Administration of Criminal Justice (1972), 57 F.R.D. 299, 309 (1973), where
Justice Day stated:
[I] can never remember a case, really never, in a long life at the
Bar.... where if the money was there the appeal was so frivolous that
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vious questions of equal protection and certainly of equal access, the very
point addressed by the Supreme Court in Boddie. The rationale of the
Boddie opinion led to a rejection of such a requirement:
[T]here [is] no necessary connection between a litigant's as-
sets and the seriousness of his motives in bringing suit ...
Moreover, other alternatives exist ... as a means for conserving
the time of the courts and protecting parties from frivolous litiga-
tion, such as penalties for false pleadings or affidavits, and actions
for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, to mention only a
few.
3
More importantly, even if such a requirement were to pass constitutional
muster, it would be virtually impossible to administer. It would again neces-
sitate the use of the case-by-case analysis rejected by the Court as unwork-
able in Gideon.
The temptation to draw the line at providing counsel to "voluntary"
litigants is also unwise. Whether a party happens to be a plaintiff or a de-
fendant is often determined by chance. In the case of an incompatible
husband and wife, for example, it would often be, under a defendant-
only counsel system, in the interest of each to persuade the other to file
divorce papers first. The winner of such a war of nerves would emerge
with a lawyer while the loser would get none.8 4
While such a result would not be a step toward greater justice, 85 the
problem need not be abandoned as insoluble. Rather, a general right to
counsel can, and perhaps should, be tempered by denying government
aid in those cases that can be handled on a contingent fee basis.
III. APPOINTED COUNSEL AS A
STRAIN ON THE SYSTEM
The fear of enormous costs is one of the major stumbling blocks prevent-
ing the courts from appointing counsel for indigents.8 6 The Supreme Court
labored under the same fear with respect to extending appointed counsel
to indigents charged with crimes in Gideon and Argersinger. Speaking for
the majority in Argersinger, Justice Douglas rejected the contention that
the nation's legal resources were insufficient to implement the extension
of court-appointed counsel to defendants charged with misdemeanors.
After assessing the number of currently practicing attorneys and law stu-
dents expected to be graduated, Douglas concluded that the number neces-
sary to implement the extension would be insignificant by comparison.8 7
the lawyer couldn't make it. I'm not suggesting nobody ever stood up
and said grandly, "Take away that $10,000; there's nothing to this
case; I will not appeal it." Maybe that happened, but maybo there are
angels in the balcony, too.
83 401 U.S. at 381-82. See part I B supra.
84 Indigent's Right, supra note 3, at 555.
85 Right to Counsel, supra note 3, at 1333-34.
86 Indigent's Right, supra note 3, at 551.
8 7 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1971).
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Chief Justice Burger concurred, observing that while the Court's holding
would add large new burdens to an already overtaxed profession, the
dynamics of the legal profession are such that it will rise to the burdens
placed upon it.88 Justice Brennan offered concrete suggestions as to where
the needed legal resources might come from. 9 The same arguments sup-
port the feasibility of extending the right to appointed counsel once again,
this time to include civil cases. Currently available studies indicate the
burden placed on society and the profession would not be as unendurable
as some anticipate. 90
Moreover, the Court should recognize that, since the judicial system is
the primary dispute-settling mechanism of our society, it is both necessary
and desirable to spend whatever is required to enable maximum effective
access to the courts. The professional responsibility of a lawyer as an
officer of the court to accept appointments to defend the poor l should
not be disregarded. Section EC 2-2592 of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility should be utilized to a greater extent to meet the burdens
that will be placed on the system. As Justice Black remarked in his dis-
senting opinion in the Indigents' Cases,
[I] believe there can be no doubt that this country can afford to
provide court costs and lawyers to Americans who are now
barred by their poverty from resort to the law for resolution of
their [civil] disputes.93
Whatever the economic impact of providing legal services to the poor may
be, that impact does not dilute the right of indigents to be represented by
counsel in civil cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Strong constitutional support can be found for the right of indigents
to counsel in civil cases. Recent Supreme Court cases provide support for
some of the basic constitutional theories. Decisions such as Boddie v.
Connecticut may serve another function as well. In the hands of a pur-
posive Court, Boddie's guarantee of access could serve as the type of
signalling device the Court has used in the past to indicate a coming
major change in policy. If that is the case, the Court will likely be un-
88 Id. at 44. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
89 Id. at 40. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an important
source of legal representation for the indigent .... [M]ore than 125 of
the country's 147 accredited law schools have established clinical pro-
grams in which faculty-supervised students aid clients in a variety
of civil and criminal matters.
90 See Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REV.
1249 (1970). See also Samore, Legal Services for the Poor, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 509
(1968).
91 See, e.g., People v. Sims, 131 I11. App. 2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 536 (1970).
92 Section EC 2-25 provides: "Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence
or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged."
93 402 U.S. at 956.
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willing to declare an unlimited right to counsel. Rather, there are indica-
tions94 that such a guarantee might be limited to proceedings that deal
with rights considered by the Court to be fundamental. Such an inter-
mediate position would not be entirely undesirable for at least two reasons.
It would allow the system to adjust to the change in an orderly fashion, a
fact that would make the decision easier for the Court. Additionally, it
may be supposed that later analysis would likely lead to expansion of the
right to other civil cases, much as Argersinger expanded Gideon.
-feffrey M. Mandell
94 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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